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Lawrence: An Unlikely Catalyst for
Massive Disruption in the Sphere of
Government Employee Privacy and
Intimate Association Claims
Matthew W. Green, Jr.!
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Lawrence v. Texas, the
landmark decision that overturned a Texas statute proscribing homosexual
sodomy. The Supreme Court held that the Texas statute infringed the right
of 'free adults" to engage in private, consensual, non-commercial sexual
conduct in their home. In doing so, the Court overturned a prior case,
Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld a Georgia sodomy statute.
In his Lawrence dissent Justice Scalia predicted that overruling Bow-
ers would cause a massive disruption of the current social order. To sub-
stantiate his point, he cites numerous cases, many in the area of public em-
ployment, the foundations of which, he contends, are now undermined
because of the Court's overruling of Bowers. This article presents a strong
argument that the massive disruption theory is unfounded in the area of
government employee privacy and intimate association claims. Such clams
typically arise when a government employee is terminated or otherwise
sanctioned because he or she is involved in a relationship the public em-
ployer claims conflicts with the employer's interests. Several reasons sup-
port the narrow reading of Lawrence with regard to these claims.
Despite Lawrence's invocation of cases discussing fundamental rights
the Court failed to state that the right at issue in that case was afundamen-
tal right, and the Court appeared to invalidate the Texas statute under ra-
tional basis review. Accordingly, lower courts interpreting Lawrence have
held that it created no new fundamental right and likewise have analyzed
privacy and intimate association claims that rely for support on Lawrence,
including claims brought by public employees, under rational basis review.
Such review generally results in upholding the government decision.
Assistant Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University, Harlan Fiske
Stone Scholar; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, Magna Cum Laude; B.A., University of
Maryland, College Park; law clerk to the Hon. Eric L. Clay, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
2001-2002. Special thanks to Mr. Kofi Asamoah for his kind assistance with this article.
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The article further demonstrates that Lawrence has neither under-
mined the at-will employment doctrine nor the deference afforded to a gov-
ernment employer to make decisions regarding its workforce, even where
those decisions curb a worker's right to enter into a relationship his or her
employer contends conflicts with its effective functioning. This article also
demonstrates that successful employee claims are rare because numerous
lower courts have adopted stringent tests to analyze employee privacy and
intimate association claims. Such tests rarely result in employee victories.
It is, therefore, unlikely that Lawrence will have a massive effect on em-
ployee privacy and intimate association claims.
To test this thesis, the article analyzes the cases that Justice Scalia
cites in his dissent as now standing on shaky foundation in the wake of
Lawrence. The article demonstrates that the holdings of these cases likely
survive Lawrence.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Government employees beware: A smooch or cuddle with the guy or
girl in the next cubicle could cost you your job. No, not because of sexual
harassment. The tryst may be mutual and might even lead to marriage-but
not before a trip to the unemployment line.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the government cannot ar-
bitrarily discharge an employee in violation of her constitutional rights.1
While there is no per se constitutional right to cuddle with a co-worker, the
Court has held that the liberty interest implied in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause grants individuals a right to engage in private,
intimate conduct.2 Likewise, the First Amendment bestows certain rights to
associate intimately with others.3 Those rights have been held to encom-
pass the right to marry and to date.4 But with coworkers? Not necessarily.
The rights of government employers to maintain a workplace of pro-
priety generally trumps the rights of its employees to engage in private, in-
timate behavior with whomever they please. Justice Scalia's dissent in the
seminal Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas,5 however, flatly but
wrongly suggests otherwise.
In Lawrence, the Court held that a Texas statute proscribing consensual
homosexual sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 The decision sounded the death knell for Bowers v. Hard-
wick,7 in which the Court had earlier upheld a Georgia sodomy statute as
applied to homosexuals.8
1. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
5. 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003).
6. Id. at 564, 577-78.
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8. 539 U.S. at 566.
2008
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Only a few years old, Lawrence is still teething and its reach is unclear.
For instance, Justice Scalia in his dissent ominously predicts that a still nas-
cent Lawrence will stagger over to areas other than consensual adult sod-
omy and topple laws regulating such activity as bigamy, adult incest, mas-
turbation, polygamy, bestiality, same-sex marriage, and prostitution.9 He
points to a series of cases that, in his view, relied on Bowers and now stand
on shaky ground because of its overruling."0 Scalia goes on to proclaim
that overruling Bowers would cause a "massive disruption of the current so-
cial order."1"
While it may be too soon to predict the extent of Lawrence's reach,
one area of the law that is not likely to undergo significant overhaul in light
of Lawrence involves the discharge of government employees for purely
private, intimate behavior. Several cases12 to which Justice Scalia points
involve government employment issues, particularly in the areas of law en-
forcement and the military.13 Justice Scalia's citation to these cases as evi-
dence of the massive social disruption he believes Lawrence will cause fails
to withstand scrutiny, largely because the cases implicate the government
acting as employer. Lawrence has done little to disturb the at-will employ-
ment doctrine.' 4 Where the government acts as an employer, courts tradi-
tionally have afforded great deference to decisions that affect discharge,
promotion, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The judicial decisions cited by Scalia also rest on the special circum-
stances of certain employment settings, such as the military or law en-
forcement. The Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently held that
the special functions that military and police employers perform require
even more deference to personnel decisions that may affect even the most
intimate aspects of their employees' lives. 5 Lawrence will likely have no
9. Id. at 590. Justice Scalia's concerns regarding the leveling of such laws have proven incorrect.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 n.2.
11. Id. at 591.
12. See infra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 589-90, 590 n.2.
14. "At-will" employment refers to the ability of both the employee and employer to terminate the
employment relationship at any time, for any reason or for no reason. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566
(8th ed. 2004). An employer, however, may not use the at-will doctrine to discharge employees on the
basis of characteristics protected by federal or state law. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West
2003) (barring discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin
under federal law); Gina Capua, Marital Status Discrimination: The Status/Conduct Debate, 50 WAYNE
L. REv. 961, 962 n.8 (2004) (listing states that proscribe employment discrimination based on marital
status and noting that not all states bar such discrimination); Jeremy C. Lowe, Homosexual Discrimina-
tion and Government Employment: Shahar v. Bowers-The Government Employer's Shield of Public
Animosity, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 191, 192 n.9 (1999) (listing several states that ban dis-
crimination in employment based on sexual orientation).
15. See infra pp. 331-32 and accompanying notes.
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effect on those decisions despite their reliance on the case it overruled,
Bowers.
This article discusses why Justice Scalia's massive social disturbance
concerns are unfounded in the context of government employment. In light
of the general deference afforded to the government as an employer, and the
particular deference to military and police employers, it is unlikely that
Lawrence will overrule or have much impact on the cases Justice Scalia
cites as having relied on Bowers. This article demonstrates that even in the
post-Lawrence era, courts will continue to uphold the government's deci-
sions to reprimand, sanction or discharge its employees, despite claims that
these decisions were based on constitutionally protected private behavior.
Part II of this article discusses the right to privacy and intimate associa-
tion and the sources of those rights-the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the First Amendment, respectively. Part
II pertains to government employment and focuses on employer decisions
that restrict employee rights to marry, date, or in some cases, even befriend
others-coworkers and non-coworkers alike. Such decisions are often en-
forced through anti-nepotism or anti-fraternization rules. These decisions
allegedly infringe upon the very right at the heart of Lawrence-the right to
enter into and maintain certain intimate, private relationships. Part III ad-
dresses the standards that courts use to review claims of alleged infringe-
ment of the right to privacy and intimate association generally, and how
those standards have been modified and applied in government employment
cases. Part III also discusses the interests of government employees and
employers that courts consider in determining whether a particular govern-
ment action infringes on the employee's privacy or intimate association
rights. Part IV further discusses Lawrence and Justice Scalia's dissent, in
which he cites several government employment cases that have relied on
Bowers. This article demonstrates that, because of lower courts' unwilling-
ness to read Lawrence broadly, and the deference afforded to government
employers in employment decisions, Lawrence will not only leave undis-
turbed the cases Justice Scalia cites in his dissent, but also will not result in
social disruption, massive or otherwise, in that area of the law.
II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
A. Substantive Due Process
Employees discharged for private, intimate conduct often allege the
2008
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employment decision violated their constitutional right to privacy. 16 The
U.S. Constitution does not specifically contain an article or amendment ref-
erencing a right to privacy.17 Dating back to at least 1891, however, the
Court has held that the Constitution implicitly contains "a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy. .."18 While at
various times the Court and various justices have found that a right to pri-
vacy arises from disparate constitutional provisions,' 9 the Court has ex-
plained that the privacy right as it pertains to making certain highly per-
sonal choices and engaging in certain intimate behavior is encompassed
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 2
In so doing, the Court has recognized that there are certain rights, al-
though not expressly set forth in the text of the constitution, that are so
"fundamental" to the person that the government may not revoke them
without a compelling reason.2 Thus, although "a literal reading of the Due
Process Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which
a State may deprive persons of liberty," 2 the Supreme Court has long held
that the Clause also contains a substantive component that prohibits certain
government actions, even if the procedures used to implement the actions
are otherwise fair.23
The most "pertinent beginning point" of the liberty interest of privacy
16. See, e.g., infra note 42.
17. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 152(1973).
18. Id. (citing Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
19. For instance, in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Jus-
tice Goldberg posited that there are fundamental personal rights "not confined to the specific terms of
the Bill of Rights." Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg found support for his propo-
sition in the language and history of the Ninth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IX. According to Justice Goldberg, the Ninth Amendment demonstrates
that the authors of the constitution intended for fundamental rights to exist that are not expressly enu-
merated in the first eight amendments and that the rights set forth in the first eight amendments are not
exhaustive. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. In addition to the Ninth Amendment, support for the right to
privacy has also been found in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and "in the concept of liberty
guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment." Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (collecting cases
and explaining that the Court and individual justices have found that these and other provisions support
a constitutional right to privacy).
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In Roe, a majority of the Court rejected the district court's finding that
the right to privacy was embedded in the Ninth Amendment; instead it believed the right was "founded
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty .. " Id; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598-99 n.23 (1977).
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
22. "All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
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is set forth in the seminal case of Griswold v. Connecticut.2 4 In Griswold,
the Court invalidated a statute that made it criminal to use or assist a person
in using contraceptives. 2' The Griswold Court established a right to marital
privacy and held the law directly infringed on the intimate relations of hus-
band and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of their relation-
ship.26 In a series of subsequent cases, the Court expounded upon the right
to privacy as applied to certain individual choices and acts outside of mar-
riage.
The holding in Griswold was extended to single persons several years
later in Eisenstadt v. Baird.7 In Eisenstadt, another contraception case, the
Court held that a Massachusetts statute proscribing the distribution of con-
traceptives to unmarried adult women was unconstitutional. 28 Recognizing
that Griswold involved marital privacy rights, the Court explained in Eisen-
stadt that a marriage is comprised of individuals, and each is entitled to the
constitutional right to privacy.29 Cases such as Roe v. Wade3" expanded this
concept. In Roe, the Court held that women had an individual privacy right
under the Due Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy.31
These cases demonstrate that fundamental rights include such acts as
marriage, child rearing, family relationships, and procreation.3 2 The Court,
however, has not defined the outer boundaries of the right to privacy,33 and
government employees have asserted due process privacy rights in scenar-
ios not enumerated here, such as the right to date.34
B. First Amendment Rights
1. The Right of Intimate Association
Challenges to a government decision affecting an employee's job and
intimate activity are often raised not only on Due Process grounds, but also
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Supreme Court has characterized Griswold as "the most pertinent
beginning point in establishing the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause," although
earlier cases also addressed substantive liberty rights. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
25. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
26. Id. at 482,485.
27. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
28. Id. at 440.
29. Id. at 453. The Court has held that the Due Process Clause actually protects "at least two dif-
ferent kinds of' privacy interests: 1) an interest in making certain types of intimate, personal choices;
and 2) the interest in avoiding the disclosure of private information. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-
600 (1977). This article pertains to the former right to privacy.
30. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
31. Id. at 153.
32. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,431 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
33. Id. at 688 n.5.
34. See infra note 42.
2008
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because the First Amendment grants a right to intimately associate with
others.35 The right of intimate association protects the decision to form and
maintain certain private, intimate relationships. 6 The Court has recognized
that the nature of relationships can vary from impersonal to those of the
most intimate type-the latter warranting constitutional protection under
the intimate association right."7
Constitutional protection extends not only to family relationships, but
to other intimate associations as well.38 To that end, in the employment
context, plaintiffs have sought constitutional protection from being dis-
charged or otherwise penalized on account of being part of a host of varying
familial and non-familial associations,39  including marriage, 40  engage-
ment,' homosexual and heterosexual relationships,42 and sibling relation-
ships.43
2. Intimate Association: A Distinct Right from Privacy?
Whether the rights to privacy and intimate association are distinct
rights hailing from two separate constitutional provisions (the Due Process
Clause and the First Amendment) remains a matter of judicial debate. Sev-
eral courts have found that the source of the right to intimate association has
not been judicially determined. Others claim that it does not derive from
35. See infra note 36; see also Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 615-16 (11 th
Cir. 1995) (recognizing a right to intimate association under the First Amendment) (citing Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
36. The Court has held that the First Amendment offers protection for two types of associations:
(1) the right to intimate association, and (2) the right to expressive association. See Bd. of Dirs. of Ro-
tary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 619-20 (1984)). Expressive association refers to the right to associate and engage in activities such
as speech, assembly, and the exercise of religion. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 (The First Amendment
protects groups whose activities are explicitly stated in the amendment: speaking, worshiping, and peti-
tioning the govemment).
37. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 545.
38. Constitutional protection extends to those relationships, "including family relationships, that
presuppose 'deep attachments and commitments to the necessary few other individuals with whom one
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
aspects of one's life."' Id.
39. See Anderson v. Lavergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing both personal
friendships and non-marital romantic relationships as the types of highly personal relationships within
the ambit of intimate associations contemplated by Roberts).
40. See Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 42-44 (2d Cir. 1999); Hughes v. City of N. Olmsted, 93
F.3d. 238, 240-41 (6th Cir. 1996).
41. See Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 936-37 (7th Cir. 2005).
42. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Public Schools, 385 F.3d 935, 944-45 (6th Cir. 2004) (asserting
rights to privacy and intimate association to maintain homosexual relationship between teacher and for-
mer student); Anderson, 371 F.3d at 880 (asserting intimate association right to maintain heterosexual
dating relationship).
43. SeeRossv. Clayton County, 173 F.3d 1305, 1311 (llthCir. 1999).
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the First Amendment at all, but is part of the Due Process right to privacy
discussed previously."
It is nevertheless apparent from the Court's decisions that if the right to
intimate association has roots in the First Amendment, that right overlaps
with the Due Process right to privacy.45 Indeed, in addressing the contours
of the right to intimate association, the Court has explained that it is a right
protected as an aspect of personal liberty, referring to such cases as Gris-
wold in explaining the right.46 Moreover, in most instances, when the lower
courts address the rights distinctly in employment cases, they apply the
same standard to both a plaintiffs Due Process/right to privacy claims and
First Amendment/right to intimate association claims.47 Accordingly, even
where the rights are seen as having distinct sources, the analysis as to
whether the rights have been infringed is most often indistinct.48
III.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
While employees may believe their personal off-duty behavior is sac-
rosanct, most scholars agree that such a blanket belief is unfounded. How-
ever, one scholar contends that, within limits, the law is beginning to fall in
line and "protect the importance of that belief. ' 49  Any such trend is not
44. Compare Adler, 185 F.3d at 42-44 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the source of the right of inti-
mate association has not yet been judicially determined; language from the Court shows it may be
grounded in the Due Process Clause or the First Amendment) with IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836
F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988) (source of right is the Fourteenth Amendment and not the First Amendment).
45. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (the right
of intimate association "is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights"); IDK, 836
F.2d at 1199 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)) (the
right of intimate association "is coextensive with the right to privacy").
46. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
47. See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 966
(1999) (affirming prior panel decision holding that whatever the source of the right, the analysis is the
same); Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 616 (11 th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a right to
marry under both the First Amendment and Due Process Clause and holding that the same analysis ap-
plies to both).
48. However, see Shane Wetmore, Shahar v. Bowers: The Eleventh Circuit's One Step Forward
And Two Steps Backward, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 159 (1998) for an argument that the Due Process right and
First Amendment right are distinct. According to Mr. Wetmore, while the right of intimate association
parallels the right to privacy in some respects, after Bowers, gays sought to rely on First Amendment
associational rights for constitutional protection of their relationships because Bowers foreclosed the
Due Process route. Id. at 159, 161, 163.
49. Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off-The-Job Employee Associa-
tional Privacy Rights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47, 95 (1997). See id. at 49-56, 63-72. Dworkin correctly ac-
knowledges, however, that off-duty associational privacy claims present a mixed picture for employees
and that courts are reluctant to expand "constitutional law to ... encompass" privacy rights in employ-
ment. Id. at 81. But see Paul Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitu-
tionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C.
2008
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evidenced in the judicial opinions addressing constitutional challenges to
public employment decisions. At best, in recent years privacy and associa-
tional claims have yielded mixed results for public employee litigants chal-
lenging dismissals or other workplace decisions resulting from private, off-
duty behavior."
As with the right to privacy in general, the Supreme Court has not de-
finitively determined the outermost boundary of constitutional protection
for private behavior in public employment." The Court's jurisprudence on
the rights of government employees in the workplace, however, has evolved
over time.
Prior to the 1960s, the Court gave the government carte blanche to re-
taliate against public employees who exercised their constitutional rights."2
As one scholar recently noted, this view was succinctly expressed by for-
mer Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Holmes in McAuliffv. Mayor of
New Bedford, where he wrote that "the petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."53
That view began to change in the 1950s, with a series of cases arising
from efforts to force public employees to swear oaths of loyalty to the state
to reveal the groups with which they associated. 4 By the late 1960s, the
DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2006) (contending that after Lawrence, "public employers should show legitimate
and substantial interests before interfering with the personal and private lives of their employees").
Contra Neal Hutchens, The Legal Effect of College and University Policies Prohibiting Romantic Rela-
tionships Between Students and Professors, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 411, 426 (2003) ("[T]he extent to which
Lawrence limits consensual relationship policies ... remains somewhat doubtful.").
50. L. Camille Herbert, Employee Privacy Law, Constitutional Protections for Employee Lifestyle
and Lawful Off-Duty Conduct, 2 EMP. PRIVACY L. § 13:7 (2005) (collecting cases).
51. The Court has rejected challenges to lower court decisions either affirming or reversing public
employment decisions that allegedly infringed on an employee's privacy rights. In Briggs v. North
Muskegon Police Department, 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983), the district court found that a po-
lice department had violated a plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy by discharging him upon learn-
ing that he was living with a woman while they were both married to other people. 563 F. Supp. at 590.
Justice White, who authored Bowers, dissented from the denial of certiorari in that case, noting that the
circuits were divided over whether extra-marital affairs, including adultery, enjoyed sufficient constitu-
tional protection to prevent public employers from disciplining their employees for such behavior.
Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 473 U.S. 909, 910 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); see also Row-
land v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari in a case where a public school teacher was discharged for
being bisexual, because the case presented "important constitutional questions regarding the rights of
public employees to maintain and express their private sexual preferences."); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie
Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari
where lower courts upheld public employer's decision to fire librarian and custodian for cohabitating in
an adulterous relationship and having a baby together, noting that the Court had "never demarcated the
precise boundaries of" the right to privacy).
52. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title Vii's Adverse Action Require-
ment on First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government Employee Speech,
79 TuL. L. REV. 669, 677-87 (2005) (explaining the "traditional view").
53. Id. at 677 (quoting McAuliffv. Mayor of New Bedford, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)).
54. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983).
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Court had completely rejected Justice Holmes' formulation. Instead, the
Court embraced the view that, while the government may deny employment
altogether, it may not subject government employees to unreasonable con-
ditions.55 Although the government as employer enjoys special deference
with regard to making certain decisions about its workforce,5 6 government
employees, even those "at will," may enjoy protection against adverse em-
ployment actions that violate their constitutional rights.57
Despite a shift in the Court's jurisprudence, the right to privacy and in-
timate association may afford the government employee little relief for at
least two interrelated reasons: (1) the low standard of review imposed on
most employment decisions related to privacy and intimate association, and
(2) the deference given to the interests of government employers, particu-
larly military and police employers.5
A. Standard of Review
1. Direct and Substantial Burden
Where "certain" fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held
that state action limiting these rights may be justified only if such action
survives strict scrutiny review. " That is, the law is only sustainable where
the government has a compelling interest and its action is narrowly tailored
to achieve only that interest.6" The Court has also held, however, that strict
scrutiny review will be applied only where a government statute or regula-
tion directly and substantially impairs a fundamental right.6 A statute or
regulation that fails to directly and substantially impair a fundamental right
55. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
56. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("The government's
interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively sub-
ordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer."); see generally
Secunda, supra note 49 at 97 (explaining that while "the government employer does not possess unfet-
tered discretion" in imposing conditions on their employees' lives which may affect constitutional
rights, the government possesses substantially more latitude in setting the terms and conditions of em-
ployment than it does when acting as sovereign governing the general citizenry).
57. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977).
58. See discussion infra pp. 321-32.
59. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (explaining that the Due Process Clause
"provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests") (emphasis added); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain funda-
mental rights are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a compelling state interest") (emphasis added; internal citations omitted); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978).
60. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
61. See infra note 62.
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receives only rational basis review.6" The direct and substantial burden test
has been applied to government statutes and regulations, whether the right
allegedly burdened by the statute or regulation is raised as a violation of a
Due Process privacy right or a First Amendment right of intimate associa-
tion.63
a. Generally-Applicable Test
The Supreme Court explicated the direct and substantial burden test in
Zablocki v. Redhail.64  There, the Court invalidated on equal protection
grounds a Wisconsin statute that prohibited certain individuals from marry-
ing without a court order.65  The statute applied to all Wisconsin citizens
who were non-custodial parents of a minor child and were subject to a court
order or judgment requiring payment of child support. 66  The Court reaf-
firmed that the right to marry is a fundamental right implicit in the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and thus analyzed, and ultimately
invalidated, the statute under strict scrutiny review." The Court found the
Wisconsin statute interfered directly and substantially with the fundamental
right to marry because it prohibited any Wisconsin resident subject to the
statute's provisions from marrying any person in any state without the court
order.6 Further, marriages held in violation of the statute were void and
punishable as crimes. 69
62. See, e.g., Lyng v. UAW, 485 US. 360, 364-66 (1988) (using rational basis review rather than
heightened scrutiny to analyze First Amendment claim as amendment to Food Stamp Act did not di-
rectly and significantly interfere with plaintiffs' fundamental right to associate with their families). Un-
der rational basis review, government enactments are generally upheld if there is a legitimate basis for
the law, and such laws "normally pass muster, since the Constitution presumes that even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558,
579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Rational
basis review permits a law to stand if there is any plausible basis for the law, whether or not the gov-
ernment actually relied on that basis or whether the basis has a foundation in the record. Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993). The party challenging the law, regulation or other action must "negative
every conceivable basis which might support it." Id. at 320.
63. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 365 (applying test to a First Amendment claim)); Parks v. City of War-
ner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 613-16 (1 th Cir. 1995) (relying on holdings of Int'l Union and Zablocki,
but using a rational basis review, the Court found an anti-nepotism rule did not substantially and directly
interfere with the fundamental right to marry and, therefore, did not infringe either a substantive due
process right to marry or a First Amendment intimate association right). But see Montgomery v. Ste-
faniak, 410 F.3d 933, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying direct and significant burden test to plaintiff's
intimate association claim, but a "shocks the conscience" standard to the substantive due process claim).
64. 434 U.S. 374.
65. Id. at 375-76.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 383-84.
68. Id. at 387.
69. Id.
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b. Application of Direct and Substantial Burden Test to Employment
Cases
Several of the lower courts have adopted the direct and substantial bur-
den test in the employment setting.7" The courts have applied the test in
varying manners, but most often with deference to the government em-
ployer. In practice, the direct and substantial burden test enacts an insur-
mountable hurdle for employees alleging that an employer action infringed
their privacy or intimate association rights."
The test has been applied such that a government decision pertaining to
an employee's privacy and associational rights to date or marry does not
substantially and directly burden those rights unless (1) a large portion of
the persons affected by the government action are prevented from forming
intimate associations with anyone at all, or (2) those affected by the rule are
absolutely or largely prevented from forming intimate associations with a
large portion of otherwise eligible persons.72  In addition, the test has pre-
vented application of strict scrutiny where the allegedly aggrieved public
employee could simply find a job elsewhere. As explained below, in prac-
tice, the rule has foreclosed privacy and associational claims in those in-
stances where the plaintiff could associate with someone other than the par-
ticular person with whom the employer or its policy bars the employee from
associating.
Beecham v. Henderson County,73 a Sixth Circuit decision, provides a
good example of how difficult it is for government employees to prove that
an employment decision warrants strict scrutiny review on the grounds that
it has a direct and substantial burden on their privacy or associational rights.
There, the plaintiff, a deputy clerk for a county courthouse, claimed that her
70. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have used the direct and substantial burden test set
forth in Zablocki in employment cases. See, e.g., Beecham v. Henderson County, Tenn., 422 F.3d 372
(6th Cir. 2005); Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d at 937-38 (7th Cir. 2005); Singleton v. Cecil, 176
F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit has used the test in employment cases as well. See Parks
v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 613 (1 1th 1995). As explained later, the Eleventh Circuit
has also employed a modified version of a test used in public speech cases to balance the interests of the
government employer and the intimate association interests of the employee in intimate association
cases.
71. That this article focuses on the direct and substantial burden test to analyze substantive due
process claims relating to privacy and the workplace does not mean to imply that all courts have used
this particular test in analyzing such claims. However, this test, which makes it extremely difficult for
plaintiffs' privacy claims to prevail, is indicative of the deference courts often afford government em-
ployers to regulate the private off-duty lives of their employees.
72. Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1040 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Vaugn v. Lawrenceburg
Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Beecham, 422 F.3d at 372.
73. 422 F.3d 372.
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discharge for becoming engaged to a married attorney who practiced in the
county where she worked violated her right of intimate association.74 The
attorney's wife worked in another office in the same building as the plain-
tiff." The affair apparently caused some tension in the courthouse and
clerk's office resulting in the plaintiffs discharge.76 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
county, reviewing the discharge decision under rational basis review.77 The
court found that the decision to fire the plaintiff did not directly and sub-
stantially burden her intimate association rights, noting that the plaintiff's
"termination did not bar her from every form of employment in every sector
of society.78 She was "discharged from one position at one courthouse" and
could work somewhere else. 9
The test is also notably broad for its reach into associations that may be
only tangential to the workplace. In Akers v. McGinnis,"° the Sixth Circuit
again rejected a constitutional challenge to a Michigan Department of Cor-
rections' workplace rule, which not only barred off-duty contact between
employees and individuals in the system, i.e., parolees or probationers, but
also barred employee contact with the individuals' families or visitors.8"
Amicus curiae in the case argued that the rule should be analyzed using
strict scrutiny, since the government was acting as sovereign-not em-
ployer-because its rule infringed associations that extended beyond the
workplace.82 The court, however, saw no difference between the associa-
tion among government employees on the one hand, and employees and of-
fenders or the offenders' family members or visitors, on the other. 83 Ac-
cording to the Akers court, no precedent exists for the theory that a
government employer's enhanced authority allows it to regulate only those
associations between government employees and others over whom it also
has enhanced authority. 84
Under the direct and substantial burden test, several types of workplace
rules that may interfere with the right to privacy or intimate association
generally survive constitutional scrutiny. Anti-nepotism or anti-fraternizing
74. Id. at 373-74.
75. Id. at 374.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 376-78.
78. Id. at 376. According to the court, while the employer's decision may have imposed an eco-
nomic burden on the plaintiff since, by marrying, she would lose her job, the decision did not prevent
her from marrying a particular class of persons.
79, Id. at 376-77.
80. 352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir. 2003).
81, Id. at 1033.
82, Id. at 1041.
83, See id.
84, Id.
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policies, which may prevent coworkers from dating or marrying, have been
generally upheld in government employment despite claims that they inter-
fere with privacy or intimate association rights." Courts generally hold that
such policies do not directly or substantially interfere with employee pri-
vacy and associational rights, and they therefore review such policies for a
rational basis.86 Similarly, under rational basis review, courts have upheld
policies that prohibit employees of penal institutions from dating, marrying
or otherwise fraternizing off-duty with inmates, parolees or probationers, or
even from doing business where a parolee or probationer might work.87 In
addition to formal written workplace rules, 88 the substantial and direct in-
quiry has also been applied to ad hoc employment decisions.89
Accordingly, under the direct and substantial burden test, employees
face an uphill battle in seeking to have infringements on their intimate asso-
ciation or privacy rights reviewed under more than a rational basis review.
And because of the deference afforded government action under rational
basis review, a government employment decision reviewed under a rational
basis standard will almost always be upheld.9 °
2. Intermediate Scrutiny of Employer Decisions under Pickering
Because the right to intimate association has roots in the First Amend-
ment, some courts have applied to intimate association claims a test that is
generally designed for public speech or expression cases." Similar to the
direct and substantial burden test, however, the First Amendment standard
rarely tips in favor of the employee's associational rights.
a. Weighing Interests in Expressive Association Cases
In the area of free speech where an adverse action is taken against a
85. Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 615 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1995); see also Beecham
v. Henderson County, Tenn., 422 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 2005) (summarizing cases affirming rationality of
anti-nepotism rules under rational basis review).
86. See Parks, 43 F.3d 609; Beecham, 422 F.3d 376.
87. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that employee was
denied neither right of intimate association nor substantive due process after her termination for purchas-
ing a car where a probationer was employed, in violation of workplace rule, although it was unclear
whether she even knew of the probationer's employment); Akers, 352 F.3d 1030 (affirming under ra-
tional basis a rule barring employees from any non-work-related contact with prisoners, parolees, or
probationers).
88. See Montgomery, 410 F.3d 933; Akers, 352 F.3d 1030.
89. See Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1127 (6th Cir. 1996) (direct and substantial burden
test applies to ad hoc decisions as well as formal written policies).
90. See supra note 62.
91. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1099, 1102-03 (11 th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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government employee for speaking out on a matter of "public concern," the
Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test to determine whether the gov-
ernment's action infringed the employee's First Amendment rights.9 2 The
Court developed the balancing test in the seminal case of Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Il-
linois.9 3 There, the Court held that the government may not compel its em-
ployees to relinquish First Amendment rights they otherwise enjoy as citi-
zens to comment on matters of public interest.94 The Pickering balancing
test is viewed as an intermediate scrutiny test, giving deference to govern-
ment employers, but recognizing that speech touching upon issues of public
concern deserves heightened protection against government encroach-
ment.95 Where the employee can show that his or her speech relates to a
matter of public concern, therefore, the court balances the interests of the
employee and those of the public employer."6
92. Pickering v. Bd of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968).
93. Id.
94. Id. In Pickering, the petitioner challenged his discharge after he wrote a letter to a local news-
paper criticizing the way the school board and superintendent of schools had handled certain proposals
to raise revenue for schools. Id. at 564. Pickering argued that the letter was protected by the First
Amendment, a position the state courts rejected. Id. at 565. Reversing the state court, the Supreme
Court agreed with Pickering that he had a right under the First Amendment to comment on matters of
public importance, a right he did not relinquish merely because he took a job as a teacher. Id. at 568.
But Pickering's right was not absolute. Id. The Court noted that the government may impose restraints
on its employees that it would be unconstitutional to impose on other non-employee citizens. Id. The
Court recognized the need to strike a balance between the First Amendment right Pickering asserted and
the government's right as his employer. Id. While the government could not force Pickering to relin-
quish the constitutional rights he held as any other citizen, it could curb his right to speech more signifi-
cantly than the speech of a non-employee. Id. The issue, according to the Court, is arriving at the bal-
ance between the employee's right as a citizen to comment on matters of public concern and the
government employer's right "in promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees." Id. The Court noted that Pickering's letter did not impede performance of his daily duties or
"interfere[] with the regular operation of the schools generally." Id. at 572-73. Under such circum-
stances, the Court held the school board had no greater right to curb Pickering's speech than it would if
it were exercising its authority as a sovereign attempting to limit the speech of someone in the general
public. Id. at 573.
95. See Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 3808 v. Kansas City, 220 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 2000)
(referring to balancing test as one of intermediate scrutiny, falling short of the exacting level of proof
required in other First Amendment contexts, but still requiring the government show more than mere
rationality since "First Amendment rights are at stake"). The Supreme Court has held that "speech on
public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values" and warrants spe-
cial protection-i.e., the Pickering balancing test. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (quoting
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)). The Court noted that such heightened
protection was warranted for public speech because the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure un-
fettered exchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). Forms of expression that do not touch
upon matters of public concern do not typically enjoy the heightened protection afforded by Pickering.
Where an employee's expression does not touch upon a matter of public concern, the government's em-
ployment decisions based on that expression enjoys wide latitude. Id. at 146.
96. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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b. Pickering in Intimate Association Cases
The Court has repeatedly found the Pickering balancing test applicable
only in cases where the employee's speech touches upon matters of public
concern.97 Because of the public concern limitation, Pickering's balancing
test may not be proper in assessing most intimate association claims.98 In-
timate association rights are generally alleged because of government action
that infringes some personal employee relationship,99 and such claims are
not usually brought to communicate issues of public concern.10I
Despite the "public concern" limitation, some lower courts have ap-
plied the Pickering test to weigh employee and employer interests in inti-
mate association cases.10' These courts still recognize, however, that where
the government acts as employer, and not sovereign, its interests are ele-
vated.1"2 Thus, applying intermediate scrutiny to burdens placed on em-
ployee intimate association interests typically results in rulings favorable to
the government. '03
The Eleventh Circuit case of Shahar v. Bowers' °4 is a prime example
of the type of deference afforded government employers when using the
Pickering test to weigh employer rights against the associational rights of
97. See San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004). In Roe, the Court rejected a police offer's
claim that his First Amendment right to free speech was infringed or that the Connick/Pickering test
applied to the decision to terminate him for making adult videos and selling them and other police-
related paraphernalia on the Internet. Id. at 84. See also Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (holding that a pre-
requisite to the Pickering analysis is that the public employee's speech involve issues of public concern).
98. See Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Con-
nicklPickering balancing test is inapplicable to intimate association claim because such right does not
depend on the exercise of the distinct First Amendment right to expressive association).
99. See id.
100. See id. (explaining that "a plaintiff must first show that her associational activity relates to a
matter of public concern" and only if she succeeds in doing so will the court employ the Pickering bal-
ancing test and balance her rights against those of her employer).
101. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (1 th Cir. 1997) (applying Pickering balancing
test to intimate association claim); see also Wieland v. Arnold, 100 F. Supp. 2d 984, 988 (E.D. Mo.
2000) (applying a "modified Pickering test"); Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 808-12
(N.D. I11. 1986). But see Via v. Taylor, 224 F. Supp. 2d 753, 760 (D. Del. 2002) (engaging in interme-
diate scrutiny or Pickering-type balance of correctional officer's right to maintain a relationship and
employer's right to terminate her because of it, but refusing to "refer" to the analysis as a Pickering
analysis since the case did not implicate employee's free speech rights). Some courts, as in Via, refer to
the Pickering test as the Pickering-Kelley test, the latter referencing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976). Similar to Pickering, the Court in Kelley held that when acting as employer, the government
may curtail its employees' conduct to a greater extent than it may in the government's role as a sover-
eign regulating the conduct of private citizens. See id. at 245 (explaining that the Court has sanctioned
"comprehensive and substantial" restrictions on First Amendment activities of public employees).
102. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1102.
103. See id. at 1104; see also Wieland, 100 F. Supp.2d at 987-89 (city's interest in maintaining or-
der of police department outweighed employee's intimate association and privacy interests). But see
Via, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62 (finding employee's interests outweighed interests of public employer).
104. 114 F.3d 1097.
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employees. Sitting en banc, the Shahar court affirmed summary judgment
against a female plaintiff who challenged, on intimate association grounds,
the decision by the Georgia Attorney General to withdraw her employment
offer as a staff attorney because of her marriage to another woman. 05
The Eleventh Circuit assumed that Ms. Shahar had a constitutionally
protected right to marry another woman. The Court then rejected the asser-
tion that her claim should be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, i.e., that
the Attorney General needed a compelling interest in his decision to with-
draw her job offer and that his decision had to be narrowly tailored to effec-
tuate only that interest. 106 Rather, the court held that the withdrawal of Ms.
Shahar's job offer should be evaluated under the same standard used to
evaluate the infringement of an employee's free speech rights-the
Pickering balancing test.0 7 Even considering that the Pickering standard
subjects the employer's decision to greater scrutiny than rational basis re-
view, after weighing the interests, the court held the balance tipped in favor
of the government.'08 The court held that Georgia's interests, including co-
hesiveness of its workforce and a potential conflict of interest with the
state's position on various gay rights issues, outweighed Ms. Shahar's in-
terest in maintaining both her relationship with her lesbian partner and her
job offer.' 09
The Shahar court found several factors tipped the scale in the Attorney
General's favor. It noted that as a staff attorney, Ms. Shahar would be privy
to the confidences of the Attorney General." 0 According to the court, em-
ployees who have access to such confidences rarely prevail in First
Amendment challenges."' Further, Attorney General Bowers had defended
Georgia's sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick. "' Allowing Ms. Shahar
to represent herself as married to another woman might result in a loss of
morale and cohesiveness. 11 The court rejected Ms. Shahar's argument that
her particular duties would have created no conflict of interest with the of-
fice's position on gay rights issues, because she would have handled only
death penalty cases. "' According to the court, "a particularized showing of
interference with the provision of public services is not required" under
105. Id. at 1100.
106. ld. at l102.
107. Id. at 1103.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1103-04.
Ill. Id. at 1103.
112. Id. at 1104-05.
113. Id. at 1]08.
114. Id.
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Pickering."5 The employer's mere concern about such interference suf-
fices. 116
In Ross v. Clayton County,"7 the Eleventh Circuit again employed a
Pickering balancing test yielding results similar to Shahar. The plaintiff in
Ross, a correctional officer, challenged his termination for living with his
brother, a probationer, in violation of a departmental policy forbidding its
employees to fraternize with probationers without obtaining special permis-
sion.1" The court noted that there is a special need in law enforcement to
avoid potential conflicts of interest and associations with probationers, even
among those who are family members. Whether Ross's living arrangement
actually created any such conflict of interest was deemed irrelevant by the
court. "9 The court held that a government employer's belief that a particu-
lar employee relationship might disrupt the workplace or undermine the
employer's objectives may tip the balance in favor of the employer, even
absent proof of such effects.'20
Cases that apply Pickering-type analyses to intimate association claims
and find in favor of employees are rare. One such example is Via v. Tay-
lor. 2 ' After engaging in Pickering-type balancing, the district court found
that a former correctional officer had been terminated in violation of her as-
sociational and privacy rights for her off-duty relationship with a parolee,
whom she eventually married.' 2 The court found that Via's intimate rela-
tionship-a marriage-fell on the higher end of the relationship spectrum,
thus warranting constitutional protection.'23 The court also rejected the ar-
gument that defendants could discharge Via without showing that her rela-
tionship caused some workplace disruption.'24 Adopting reasoning from
Third Circuit free speech cases, the court held that a public employer must
show that the challenged relationship was likely to cause disruption.'25 Ac-
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 173 F.3d 1305 (11 th Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 1306-07.
119. Id. at 1311.
120. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also found it particularly relevant that Ross could have, but
failed to, request special permission to live with his brother. Id. at 1312. That exception to the general
rule forbidding fraternization of employees and probationers enhanced the reasonableness of the rule
and further tilted the balance in the employer's favor. Id.
121. 224 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761-62 (D. Del. 2002). In Via, the court "hesitated" to call the interme-
diate-scrutiny test it applied to the plaintiff's claim a Pickering-Kelley balancing test. See id. at 761 n.4
(explaining that Pickering-Kelley test is used in cases involving free speech rights and not to the intimate
association claim advanced by the plaintiff in Via). Despite the Via court's hesitance to refer to the test
it used in the case as a Pickering-Kelley test, it nevertheless analyzed the plaintiff's claim using interme-
diate scrutiny and in doing so found Pickering-Kelley factors relevant to its analysis. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 760.
124. Id. at 762 n.5.
125. Id.
2008
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cording to the court, the defendants failed to make such a showing as they
presented no evidence that Via's conduct had any impact on the work-
place. 12' The Via court thus rejected cases such as Shahar and Ross, which
required only the employer's belief of workplace disruption.
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that even when applying a level
of scrutiny higher than rational basis to employer decisions affecting their
employees' private relationships, courts still afford employers substantial
deference as to such decisions. With few exceptions,127 the mere allegation
or assumption that a particular relationship might disrupt the workplace of-
ten suffices to justify the employment decision. 121
B. Interests at Stake
1. Government Employees
Applying the appropriate standard of review to the government action
is only half the battle. It is also necessary to determine the interests being
weighed. Generally, the interest of the public employee is to maintain,
without any adverse job action, the intimate relationship or to engage in the
activity he or she deems private. 2 9
One issue public employees face in asserting rights of intimate associa-
tion is that no two intimate associations are alike. It is generally recognized
that relationships outside of the family, such as friendships or engagements,
may be entitled to some constitutional protection. 3 ' Thus, where the rela-
tionship for which protection is sought falls closer on the scale to "familial"
relationships, the more likely the courts will recognize the relationship as
entitled to constitutional protection. "'
Further, while relationships most deserving of constitutional protection
are familial in nature,'32 some cases suggest that certain familial relation-
ships may warrant greater protection than others. Marriage arguably enjoys
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., id. at 761-62.
128. See id.; Shahar v. Bowers, 130 F.3d 1097, 1108 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that showing of in-
terference not required); see also Wieland v. Arnold, 100 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (hold-
ing that showing that relationship had actual effect on performance was not necessary).
129. Wieland, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (discussing competing interests of the employee and em-
ployer).
130. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987); Akers v.
McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, 55 F.3d 1211,
1214-15 (6th Cir. 1995)) (friendship protected as an intimate association); Montgomery v. Stefaniak,
410 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2005) (engaged couple constitutionally protected).
131. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
132. See id.
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the greatest protection.133 Relationships that fall farthest from marriage and
family, such as dating relationships or friendships, generally receive less
constitutional protection. 134
2. Government Employers
While a government employee does not relinquish all constitutional
rights at the office door, those rights are significantly more circumscribed
for the public employee than for the private employee.135 As an employer,
the government can regulate various aspects of employees' lives, including
their dress,'36 hair length,137 jewelry,138 and, despite any constitutional right
to privacy and intimate association, with whom employees may enter into
intimate relationships. 139
An employer's concern of the effect the relationship might have in the
workplace may suffice to tip the scale in the employer's favor to discharge
or otherwise take adverse action against the employee on account of the
personal relationship.'40 If, therefore, the government employer believes an
employee's relationship might create a conflict of interest or otherwise in-
terfere with the goals and objectives of the employer, the employee may be
fired because of the relationship. 141
Moreover, the government's interests, while already enhanced as an
employer, are even more elevated in certain settings. 142 Most notably, the
133. For instance, the right of a correctional officer to live with his probationer brother may warrant
less protection than a married couple claiming the wife was discharged for her association with her hus-
band, whose interests conflicted with the wife's employer. Ross v. Clayton County, 173 F.3d 1305,
1312 n.12 (11 th Cir. 1999). See also Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1999); (reinstating a
state employee's claim that he had been discharged for association with his co-worker wife, who had
filed a lawsuit against the state, and noting that the plaintiff's "claim is grounded on the most intimate of
relationships, the marriage relationship, and warrants an appropriately high degree of protection"); Wie-
land, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (holding that while marriage between a police officer and a felon the officer
was dating would have undoubtedly been entitled to the full scope of constitutionally protection, their
"amorphous" social relationship instead warranted some protection, but not "the full scope of Constitu-
tional protection"); see also Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 806-07 (N.D. 111. 1986) ("the
degree of constitutional protection for an "intimate" association depends on exactly what relationship is
involved. Only traditional relationships with a cognizable basis in law-those associated with marriage
and family-receive maximum protection within this category.").
134. See, e.g., Wieland, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (refusing to grant full constitutional protection to
"amorphous social relationship" although the couple was apparently intimate).
135. See supra note 56.
136. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1976).
137. See id.
138. Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir. 1990).
139. See discussion supra pp. 323-30.
140. See discussion supra pp. 327-30 and accompanying notes.
141. See discussion supra pp. 327-30 and accompanying notes.
142. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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government as a law enforcement, correctional institutions, or military em-
ployer is afforded greater deference in regulating the private lives of its em-
ployees than other government sectors. The rationale is that these are
"heightened" settings with particular needs for order, discipline, and obedi-
ence and particular concerns regarding conflicts of interest. "' Courts are
loathe to second guess employer decisions that may affect intimate aspects
of an employee's personal life even when an employer decides to sever the
employment relationship because it believes an employee's personal life or
intimate associations might interfere with the employer's interests. '44 Con-
sequently, government action that burdens an intimate relationship of a gov-
ernment employee outside of the military, law enforcement or a penal insti-
tution may receive less deference than would government action in one of
the heightened settings. 145
143. Police-Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ("promotion of safety of person and
property is... at the core of the State's police power," and, because governments "employ a uniform
police force to aid in the accomplishment of that purpose," employer choices regarding dress, equip-
ment, and organizational structure are entitled to a presumption of validity); Ross v. Clayton County,
173 F.3d 1305, 1311 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (explaining that "in the context of law enforcement, there is a spe-
cial need to employ persons who act with good judgment and avoid potential conflicts of interest;" asso-
ciations with felons or probationers undermine these objectives); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d
464, 476 (Tex. 1996) (Spector, J., concurring) (police departments are quasi-military and "may require
unquestionable obedience"); see id. at 477 (Owen, J. concurring) (stating that "[tihe interests of the State
are even more compelling in the oversight of police officers and other quasi-military organizations be-
cause of the State's goal in protecting the safety of the general public (citing Texas State Employees
Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 746 S.w.2d 203, 205-06 (Tex. 1987)).
Penal institutions-Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging prison guard's
claim she was forced to choose between marriage to prisoner and her job, and recognizing such inherent
problems, but ruling that potential conflicts of interest and perceived favoritism among other prisoners
justified such a burden, and holding deference to the government's interests was not lessened even
though guard did not work at the same facility as her prisoner husband). Military-Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974) (holding that the military's role in fighting wars necessitates a specialized,
separate society and that the rights of soldiers must be curtailed to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-69 (1981) (Congress is subject to the
due process clause but the tests and limitations may apply differently, e.g., with more deference granted
in the military context); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 n.19 (1943) ("[T]hose
subject to military discipline are under many duties and may not claim many freedoms that we hold in-
violable as to those in civilian life."). Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503 (2005) provides an inter-
esting discussion of the interests of the military in maintaining its "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in
light of Lawrence. Id. at 521. According to the court, discharge from the military for homosexual con-
duct on the basis of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the military equivalent of being fired pursuant to an ad-
ministrative proceeding. Id. Loomis cites unit cohesion and reducing sexual tension among solders as
some of the justifications for maintaining its policy to discharge or fire individuals for homosexual be-
havior. Id.
144. See, e.g., Keeney, 57 F.3d at 581 (explaining that jails are not safe places and that jail adminis-
trators, not judges, should set the standard by which they are to be made safe; "[a]s long as the concerns
expressed by correctional authorities are plausible, and the burden that a [decision] of a jail or prison...
places on protected rights [is] a light or moderate one, the courts should not interfere" with safety meas-
ures set by correctional authorities).
145. Compare Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a decision by the New
York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities to terminate plaintiff-employee
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IV.
LA WRENCE: AN UNLIKELY LEVELER OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
EMPLOYMENT CASES
Considering the wide latitude the government enjoys in regulating the
private lives of members of its workforce, it is unlikely that Lawrence v.
Texas will have much of an impact on privacy and intimate association
claims in the workplace. To demonstrate why requires a critical look at
Lawrence, with a particular focus on Justice Scalia's dissent and the cases
he cites in support of his argument that Lawrence will cause massive social
disruption.
A. Due Process under Bowers and Lawrence
1. Lawrence: Overruling a Precedent Not Worth Keeping
Lawrence is factually similar to the case it overruled, Bowers v. Hard-
wick. "46 Both cases involved challenges to a state sodomy statute.1 47
Unlike the Georgia statute in Bowers, however, the Texas statute in Law-
rence expressly applied only to homosexual conduct.14 In striking down
the Texas statute, the Court recognized that Bowers was the controlling au-
thority. 4 9 It held, however, that Bowers had been wrongly decided.15°
Moreover, in contrast to the narrow issue framed by the Court in Bowers-
whether there was a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy151-
because of association with his wife stated a claim under First Amendment for retaliatory discharge)
with Ross, 173 F.3d at 1311-12 (holding that correctional agency had greater interest in avoiding poten-
tial conflicts of interest than employee had in living with his probationer brother) and McCabe v. Shar-
rett, 12 F.3d 1558 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (holding that police chief who handled matters of great sensitivity
involving issues affecting an employee's husband had interests paramount to those of his secretary to
maintain her job and marriage).
146. The plaintiffs in each case, Michael Hardwick and John Lawrence, were arrested and charged
with violating their respective states' sodomy laws. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 566 (2003)
(discussing the facts of each case). In both cases, the alleged offenses occurred in their respective
homes. Id. In Lawrence, the police were called to check on an alleged weapons violation, and upon
arriving, found Lawrence engaged in a sexual act with another adult male. Id. at 562. Similarly, in
Bowers the police arrested Hardwick after observing him having sex with another adult male in Hard-
wick's bedroom. 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
147. 539 U.S. at 566.
148. Id. at 563.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 569.
151. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117
HARv. L. REv. 1894, 1951-55 (2004). Professor Tribe, who represented Michael Hardwick before the
Court in Bowers, provides an insightful, first-hand discussion on the history of Bowers and how the
Court went out of its way to narrowly frame the issue as being about homosexual sodomy. Id. Profes-
sor Tribe explains that the Court cast the issue as being about homosexual sodomy, in particular, al-
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the Court in Lawrence framed the issue before it broadly. The issue was
not about homosexual sodomy, but rather whether the petitioners "were free
as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty un-
der the Due Process Clause."'52 Holding the Texas statute furthered no le-
gitimate state interest that could justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual, the Court invalidated the statute, and overruled
Bowers. 1
53
Lawrence was striking for what it did not say as well as for what it did
say. Although the decision relied on such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut
and involved the Due Process right to privacy, the Court never once stated
that the right at issue, that is, whether "free adults" may "engage" in private,
consensual, non-commercial sexual conduct in their home, was a funda-
mental right. 154  Indeed, the Court appears to have invalidated the Texas
statute on rational basis rather than strict scrutiny review. 155
In overruling Bowers, however, the Court explicated several reasons
why it was precedent not worth keeping. The Court explained, among other
things, that before overruling precedent that pertains to a liberty interest, it
must weigh the individual or societal reliance that has been placed on the
existence of that interest. 56 The Court held that the holding in Bowers had
not caused the type of "detrimental reliance" that would give the Court
pause in overruling that decision.'57 It went on to note that in its estimation,
Bowers actually raised uncertainty for precedents issued before and after
though Hardwick did not plead his complaint in this manner. Id. Indeed, because Georgia's sodomy
statute was facially neutral and applied to both homosexuals and heterosexuals, Hardwick's attorney
argued that the statute violated due process for both heterosexuals and homosexuals, Id.
152. 539 U.S. at 564.
153. Id. at 578.
154. See id. at 564; see also id. at 567 ("It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain
their dignity as free persons.").
155. Id. at 578 (finding no legitimate state interest to justify the Texas statute). Some scholars con-
tend, however, that it is too simplistic an analysis to assume the Court used rational basis review to over-
rule the Texas statute, considering the Court invoked cases such as Griswold and Roe, which undoubt-
edly involved fundamental rights. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 151 at 1915-17. Professor Tribe contends
that while there may be some confusion regarding the standard of review,
To search for the magic words proclaiming the right protected in Lawrence to be "fun-
damental," and to assume that in the absence of those words mere rationality review applied,
is to universalize what is in fact only an occasional practice [of announcing a standard of re-
view]. Moreover, it requires overlooking passage after passage in which the Court's opinion
indeed invoked the talismanic verbal formula of substantive due process but did so by putting
the key words in one unusual sequence or another-as in the Court's declaration that it was
dealing with a "protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause [that] has a substantive di-
mension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person."
1d. at 1917 (emphasis added).
156. 539 U.S. at 577.
157. Id.
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Bowers that contradict the central holding of the case."'
The Court further adopted the rationale of Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion in Bowers. 59 One of Justice Stevens' propositions was that a
state's tradition in viewing a particular practice as "immoral," such as ho-
mosexual sodomy, does not alone suffice as a basis to uphold a law banning
the practice.16 In a sharp dissent, Justice Scalia seized on the majority's
"societal reliance" and "morality" rationales for overruling Bowers.
2. A Vitriolic Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Scalia took the majority to task for never ex-
pressly holding that the right to homosexual sodomy was fundamental.'
He also challenged what he refers to as the Court's most current "approach"
to "overrule an erroneously decided precedent ... ."162 He reduced the ma-
jority's approach to three criteria. "[E]rroneously decided" precedent may
be overruled if: (1) "the foundations have been eroded by subsequent deci-
sions;" (2) "it has been subject to substantial and continuing criticism;" and
(3) "it has not induced individual or societal reliance that counsels against
overturning" it. 163
As to the third factor in particular, Justice Scalia contends that the
"'societal reliance' on the principles confirmed in Bowers and discarded"
by the Court in Lawrence "has been overwhelming." 164 He claims that in-
numerable judicial decisions have relied on the proposition espoused in
158. Id. The Court was arguably correct in this regard. When Bowers was decided, cases such as
Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe could have allowed the Court to find a fundamental right to privacy in the
intimate sexual conduct at issue in Bowers. These pre-Bowers cases addressed the fundamental right to
make highly personal individual choices. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 564-66; see also Williams v. Att'y Gen.
of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1253-54 (1 1th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Williams v. King, 543 U.S. 1152
(2005) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing cases such as Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe established the exis-
tence of a right to make private decisions about one's sexual activities). The Bowers Court, however,
narrowly framed the issue before it as being about a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
and distinguished those cases involving contraception and abortion, among others. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1254 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
159. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 586.
162. Id. at 587.
163. Id. As to the first criterion, Justice Scalia does not dispute the Court's claim that a prior deci-
sion, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), "'eroded' the 'foundations' of Bowers' rational-basis hold-
ing." In Romer, the Court, applying rational basis review, struck down class-based legislation directed
at homosexuals on equal protection grounds. 517 U.S. 620. Justice Scalia contends, however, that Roe
v. Wade had been eroded by subsequent authority as well, including Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997), and that the majority was unwilling to overrule Roe. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587. As to
the second criterion, he contends that the majority cited little, if any, non-historical criticism of Bowers,
and that Roe too has been subject of unrelenting criticism. Id. at 588.
164. Id. at 589.
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Bowers, that "a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is
immoral and unacceptable constitutes a rational basis for regulation." '165
Justice Scalia also charges that society has relied substantially on the propo-
sition that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right.'66 Citing one
statute and fourteen cases that apparently support these propositions, Justice
Scalia concludes ominously, "[w]hat a massive disruption of the current so-
cial order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails." '167
Justice Scalia's concern is overstated."16 Half of the fourteen cases and
the one statute arise in the area of government employment.'69 In five of
those seven cases, plaintiffs challenged governmental action based on pri-
vacy and intimate association rights.
Lawrence and its overruling of Bowers will not have a massive, if any,
165. Id.
166. Id. at 590 n.2.
167. Id. at 590 n.2, 591.
168. Justice Scalia's massive disruption theory has proven incorrect outside of the employment
context as well. Several federal courts have held that Lawrence not only failed to establish a fundamen-
tal right to engage in homosexual sodomy, but established no new fundamental rights under the U.S.
Constitution. See Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1235-36 (1 1th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, Williams v. King, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005) ("[T]he Supreme Court's substantive-due-process
precedents [have never] recognized a free-standing 'right to sexual privacy'; and holding that Lawrence
did not create such a right); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 518 (2005) (noting that the Su-
preme Court did not hold that sodomy was a fundamental right and refusing to presume such to be the
case without an explicit holding from the Court). But see Tribe, supra note 151, at 1917 (considering
Court invoked Griswold and other precedents in Lawrence, the "relationship" right the Court protected
in that case was "fundamental"). Further, Lawrence has provided little support to individuals challeng-
ing laws related to polygamy, incest or prostitution--conduct that Justice Scalia analogized to homosex-
ual sodomy. See, e.g., Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. PHE, Inc., 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (relying on
Lawrence and other Supreme Court cases to hold that a Texas statute that barred the selling, advertising,
giving or lending of devices that provide sexual stimulation infringed the privacy rights of individuals to
engage in conduct in the home without government intrusion, but also noting that its holding neither
barred laws regarding commercial sex, such as prostitution, nor protected "the public display of material
that is obscene as defined by the Supreme Court ... ."); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006) (af-
firming defendant's conviction and rejecting argument that Lawrence invalidated state law against big-
amy); State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 545-46 (Ariz. 2006) (rejecting challenge to prostitution laws and
collecting cases holding the same); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Law-
rence did not invalidate state incest statute); Beard v. State, No. M200402227CCAR3PC, 2005 WL
1334378, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2005) (same); see also Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235 (Lawrence
created no free-standing constitutional right to privacy). This is not to say that Lawrence has not pro-
vided support to certain groups or individuals alleging violation of their constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Johnston v. Missouri Dep't of Social Servs., No. 0516, 2005 WL 3465711 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2005)
(holding that lesbian could not be barred from serving as foster parent solely because of homosexuality);
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005) (holding Virginia's fornication statute unconstitu-
tional, but emphasizing that its holding "like that of the Supreme Court in Lawrence, .... does not affect
the Commonwealth's police power regarding regulation of public fornication, prostitution, or such other
crimes"); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding under state consti-
tution that a ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional and citing Lawrence). But see Wilson v,
Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306-07 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that Lawrence does not extend to same-
sex marriage and refusing to read Lawrence as creating a fundamental right to same-sex marriage).
169. See discussion infra pp. 337-43.
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effect on those decisions. Lower courts have been wary to interpret Law-
rence so broadly as to sanction every purported right to privacy plaintiffs
have thus far advanced. 170 Moreover, Lawrence and Bowers dealt with the
government as a sovereign regulating the private conduct of its citizens.
Whatever limits Lawrence imposes on the government's ability to curtail
the sexual and privacy rights of its citizens, the government's ability to cur-
tail such rights arguably remains at its zenith in the area of public employ-
ment.171  Accordingly, as explained below, the employment cases Justice
Scalia cites, notwithstanding Lawrence, will likely do little to change the
deference afforded government employers to regulate the private sexual
conduct of their employees or expand employee rights in that area.172
B. A Massive Social Disruption? Not Likely
Of the fourteen cases Justice Scalia cites in his dissenting opinion,
seven pertain to government employment: Marcum v. McWhorter,173
Holmes v. California Army National Guard,74 Schowengerdt v. United
States,"7 5 Charles v. Baesler,'76 Walls v. City of Petersburg,l"' High Tech
170. See supra note 168.
171. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
172. Professor Secunda argues to the contrary. See supra note 49, at 119, 131-32. He points to a
case decided by a state trial court to support his theory that Lawrence has expanded the rights of em-
ployees. Id. The case involved a North Carolina sheriff who informed a female employee that she
might lose her job after he learned she was cohabiting with her boyfriend in violation of a state cohabita-
tion statute. North Carolina Family Policy Council, N.C. Judge Legalizes Adultery and Fornication,
http://www.ncfpc.org/stories/060914sl.html (last visited October 16, 2008). The statute, entitled "For-
nication and Adultery," punished cohabitation between unmarried persons. N.C. Gen. Star. Ann. § 14-
184 (1994). The sheriff informed the employee that her living situation violated the statute and that she
would either have to move out, get married, or find other employment. See N.C. Judge Legalizes Adul-
tery and Fornication, supra. She chose instead to file a lawsuit alleging the statute violated her right to
privacy in violation of Lawrence. Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05-VCS 267, 2006 WL 3103008, at *1 (Super.
Ct. N.C. August 25, 2006). The Superior Court agreed with the plaintiff as to the statutory provisions
that addressed fornication. Id. It made no ruling with regard to the provisions pertaining to adultery.
Id. at * I n. 1. The import of this decision is unclear. What is clear is that the case does not evince a
"massive disruption of the current social order." First, the North Carolina court failed to employ the
direct and substantial burden test or a Pickering-Connick balancing test. As explained earlier, these tests
have been used by numerous federal courts to analyze privacy and intimate association claims. More-
over, the court's order does not indicate whether the relationship actually or even potentially disrupted
the work environment. Thus, while the court invalidated the statute, the court did not hold that a gov-
ernment employer is barred from considering the effect a purely private relationship may have on the
workplace in deciding whether to terminate the employee. There is no suggestion that, had the plain-
tiffs relationship actually or potentially caused disruption in the workplace, the employer would have
been unable to terminate her. Moreover, even prior to Lawrence, courts had held that where there was
no showing of workplace disruption (as appears to have been the case in Hobbs), a plaintiffs right to
maintain a private relationship might trump the employer's right to terminate the employee because of
the relationship. See Via v. Taylor, 224 F. Supp. 2d 753, 762 n.5 (D. Del. 2002).
173. 308 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2002).
174. 124 F.3d 1126(9th Cir. 1997).
175. 944 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,178 and City of
Sherman v. Henry.'79 Of those seven, five involve intimate association
claims and four pertain to the military or law enforcement. 180 Critically re-
viewing these cases and the propositions for which they cite Bowers casts
serious doubt on the theory that overruling Bowers with Lawrence will re-
sult in massive social disruption, let alone change the outcome of these em-
ployment cases.
1. Marcum v, McWhorter and City of Sherman v. Henry
Both Marcum and Sherman involved discharge of law enforcement of-
ficers because of adulterous conduct. Equating homosexual sodomy to
adultery, the Sixth Circuit and the Texas Supreme Court relied on Bowers
for the proposition that "much like sodomy, proscriptions against adultery
have ancient roots."'' Both courts held that there is no constitutional right
to engage in an adulterous relationship, and that the adulterous nature of the
relationships in which the officers engaged sufficed to strip those relation-
ships of all constitutional protection.'82
It is unlikely Lawrence would change the outcome of these cases for at
least three reasons. First, it is not at all certain that Lawrence even applies
to adulterous relationships in general, let alone in the context of police en-
forcement. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit recently addressed the issue of
whether Lawrence overruled Marcum and found the proposition "doubt-
ful." '183 While an adulterous relationship could, theoretically, be long term
and deeply committed like a marriage, which receives constitutional protec-
tion,'84 such relationships arguably fall outside the scope of Lawrence.
Lawrence itself stated that it did not "involve" situations where "persons
176. 910 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1990).
177. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
178. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
179. 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996).
180. Charles and Walls did not involve intimate association claims. Charles, 910 F.2d 1349, cited
Bowers for the narrow proposition that the contractual right claimed by the plaintiff was not "fundamen-
tal", as "[r]outine state-created contractual rights are not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition..."' Id. at 1353 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986)). Walls involved a
challenge to a government questionnaire that asked employees highly personal questions and implicated
a due process privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment: the individual's interest in avoiding the
disclosure of private information. Walls, 895 F.2d at 192-93.
181. Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2002); Sherman, 928 S.W.2d at 469-
70.
182. 308 F.3d at 641-42; 928 S.W.2d at 469-70.
183. Beecham v. Henderson County, Tenn., 422 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2005).
184. See e.g., Marcum, 308 F.3d at 644 (Clay, J., concurring) (rejecting the majority opinion's
blanket holding that an adulterous relationship is devoid of any constitutional protection).
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might be injured.. ."185 There is ample support for the argument that adul-
terous relationships hurt innocent spouses and children and fit within the
Court's statement of what Lawrence "does not involve."' 8 6  In fact,
Sherman latched onto the argument that adultery "often rips apart families,"
and destroys the institution of marriage in refusing to extend constitutional
protection to adulterous activity.1 8
7
Second, Lawrence does not alter the special deference generally af-
forded law enforcement agencies. In fact, both concurring opinions in
Sherman cited this special deference as a basis for upholding the officer's
discharge in that case. 1
88
Finally, for courts such as the Sixth Circuit that apply the direct and
substantial burden test, it would be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to suc-
cessfully challenge a workplace rule or decision that terminates an em-
ployee for engaging in an adulterous affair or indeed any intimate conduct.
Even assuming the relationship was entitled to some modicum of constitu-
tional protection, under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government action bur-
dening that relationship would be subject to rational basis review in all but
the rarest of instances. Marcum would likely receive such review here, as
the plaintiff was not barred from forming all intimate associations (since he
was already married) and could have simply found another job after being
terminated on account of his extra-marital relationship. 8 9 Lawrence does
185. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
186. Id.
187. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 469-70 (Tex. 1996); see also Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.4 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that adultery, unlike the con-
sensual sexual conduct at issue in Bowers, may "injure third persons, in particular, spouses and children
of persons who engage in extramarital affairs"). The fact that marriage and family are near the end of
the spectrum where intimate association rights are at their greatest has been the basis by which some
courts have held that adultery is entitled to no constitutional protection at all, without discussion of any
other attributes of the relationship. See Marcum, 308 F.3d at 641 (holding that the right to privacy does
not include adultery); Sherman, 928 S.W.2d at 471, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1156 (1997) (explaining that
"adulterous conduct is the very antithesis of marriage and family" and enjoys no constitutional protec-
tion). Thus, adulterous conduct may be seen as the polar opposite of marriage and family, which suf-
fices to usurp it of all constitutional protection.
188. 928 S.W.2d at 47-77 (Spector and Owen, JJ., concurring).
189. See Beecham v. Henderson County, Tenn., 422 F.3d 372, 377-78 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding
ad hoc decision to terminate employee for adulterous affair under rational basis review since termination
did not impose a direct and substantial burden on plaintiff's right of intimate association; economic bur-
den of losing job was not a direct and substantial burden on plaintiff's ability to marry a particular class
of persons that would trigger strict-scrutiny review); see also Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933,
938-39 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that workplace rule forbidding probation officer from purchasing car
from the employer of a probationer did not impose a direct and substantial burden on the plaintiffs in-
timate association rights and passed rational basis review); Flaskamp v. Dearborn Public Schools, 385
F.3d 935, 941-45 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that decision to deny tenure to teacher because of relationship
with former student imposed no direct and substantial burden on the relationship and decision was ra-
tional; no violation of First Amendment association right); Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying substantial and direct burden test and affirming on rational basis grounds a rule barring
employees from any non-work-related contact with prisoners, parolees or probationers); Singleton v.
2008
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not change the direct and substantial burden test established in Zablocki for
the circuits that have adopted that test in employment cases. For these rea-
sons, it is unlikely that Lawrence will extend a constitutional right to police
officers to engage in adulterous conduct.
2. Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard and Schowengerdt v. United States
Both Holmes and Schowengerdt involved challenges to military poli-
cies that required discharge of personnel for engaging in homosexual con-
duct. In Holmes, "I the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion, First Amendment, and substantive due process challenges to the
military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.19"' As for the due process chal-
lenge, the court held that Bowers and an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Beller v.
Middendorf,'92 foreclosed the argument. 193
Likewise, in Schowengerdt,194 the court rejected the plaintiff's due
process challenge to a Naval Reserve policy that required discharge of bi-
sexuals or gays.195 The Schowengerdt court noted that in Beller, a pre-
Bowers case, the court had already upheld the constitutionality of similar
Navy regulations that permitted the discharge of persons who engaged in
homosexual activity. 196 Further, the court upheld those regulations under a
level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. 197 The court reasoned that if the
regulations were sustainable, pre-Bowers and under the higher level of re-
view, then they would certainly pass muster under rational basis review.1 98
The Ninth Circuit has not held that Lawrence created a fundamental right to
privacy or otherwise such that the regulations reviewed in that case would
today receive anything other than rational basis review.1 99
Cecil, 176 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming panel decision, which held that decision to terminate hus-
band based on wife's conduct posed no direct and substantial burden on the marital relationship and that
termination decision was rational; no violation of "substantive due process occupational liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment").
190. Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).
191. Id. at 1131-32. Justice Scalia also cited the actual "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" statute that was
addressed in Holmes, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp.1994) ("Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed
forces"), to support his societal reliance argument. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 n.2 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. 124 F.3d at 1136.
194. Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1991).
195. Id. at 489-90.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. At least one judge on the Ninth Circuit has since remarked that Lawrence does not alter the
court's holding in Holmes. See Hensala v. Dep't of Air Force, 343 F.3d 951, 959 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Tashima, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Perhaps the more interesting question is whether the policy and others
like it would survive rational basis review today.2 °° In the unique world of
the military, the policy would likely stand. The Court has long character-
ized the military as a "society separate from civilian society," which by ne-
cessity, has developed its own laws and traditions.0 1 Moreover, in post-
Bowers litigation, for purposes of rational basis review, the military dis-
avows that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is based at all on its belief that homo-
sexuality is immoral.20 2 Instead, it contends that its reasons for the policy
include: unit cohesion, reducing sexual tension, and protecting privacy.0 3
Courts have found these bases distinguishable from mere disdain for gays,
and therefore rational, even in light of Lawrence.20 4
3. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office
In High Tech Gays,2 °5 the Ninth Circuit addressed a challenge to a De-
partment of Defense ("DOD") policy that subjected homosexual applicants
vying for certain top secret security clearances to an expanded investigation
and mandatory adjudications.0 6 There was also evidence that the policy
denied certain clearances to gay applicants.2 7  A class of plaintiffs chal-
lenged the DOD policies on Fifth Amendment equal protection and First
200. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expounding "mas-
sive social disruption" theory).
201. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); see also Diane H. Mazur, Is "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" Unconstitutional After Lawrence? What It Will Take To Overturn The Policy, 15 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 423, 431 (2004) (explaining that in Parker, the Court characterized the military "as a sepa-
rate society with a different relationship to the Constitution than civilian society"). See generally Rost-
ker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-69 (1981) (Congress is subject to the due process clause but the tests
and limitations may apply differently, e.g., with more deference granted in the military context).
202. See, e.g., Loomis, 68 Fed. Cl. at 519 (arguing that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" did not violate sub-
stantive due process because it was justified by purposes other than to promote "morality and private
bias").
203. See id. at 519. In Loomis, in support of its rational-basis argument for the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy, the government pointed to the congressional findings set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 654. Accord-
ing to those policies the "worldwide deployment of United States military forces" makes it necessary for
service members "to involuntarily.., accept living conditions and working conditions that are often
Spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy." Id. at 519-20 (quot-
ing 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(12)). The government contended that instead of discriminating against gay ser-
vice members, it assumes that all service members-heterosexual and homosexual- will act in accord
with their sexual desires. Id. at 520. Given that assumption, the military claims that it must treat gays
and straights differently considering the lack of privacy and close living conditions service members
may encounter. Id. The military can promote unit cohesion, reduce sexual tension and protect privacy
in the case of heterosexuals by separating them by gender. Id. It cannot do so with homosexual service
members. Id.
204. See id.
205. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
206. Id. at 565.
207. Id.
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Amendment free association grounds.2 °8 Under the DOD regulations, the
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Organization ("DISCO") conducted
investigations of all applicants for secret service clearance. 2 9 For top secret
clearance, the Defense Investigative Service ("DIS") completed a back-
ground investigation.210 If adverse information was uncovered, DIS con-
ducted an expanded investigation to substantiate or disprove the informa-
tion and interviewed the applicant.21' If DISCO could not find that granting
the security clearances was in the national interest, it referred the particular
applicant's case to another arm of the agency for review and adjudica-
tion.2 1 2 All homosexual applicants were referred for review and adjudica-
tion.213
The district court found that homosexual applicants were a suspect or
quasi-suspect class and, therefore, applied strict scrutiny to the regula-
tions."' Relying in part on Bowers, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It held
that "if there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy un-
der the Due Process Clause... it would be incongruous to expand the reach
of equal protection to find a fundamental right of homosexual conduct un-
der the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." 2 15
It is unlikely that Lawrence alters the court's basic holding, i.e., that ra-
tional basis review versus strict scrutiny was applicable to the DOD's regu-
lations.216 Further, the government's purported rationale for its regulations
in High Tech Gays was not moral disapproval of or disdain for gays, but
rather national security. 2 7  The government claimed and presented proof
208. Id.
209. Id. at 566.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 568.
214. Id. at 571.
215. Id. The Court did not only rely only on Bowers, however, to find that gay individuals were
not a suspect or quasi-suspect class. It also found support in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen-
ter, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), holding that classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, while classifications based on gender and illegitimacy are subject to a heightened
standard of review. Id. at 573. The court noted, however, that homosexuality had never been subjected
to a heightened standard of review. Id. Further, while the court acknowledged that homosexuals had
suffered a history of discrimination, it did not believe that homosexuality was an immutable characteris-
tic such as race or gender. Id. at 573-74. The court also stated that gays were not without political
power and thus had the ability to attract lawmakers to address their particular concerns of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 574.
216. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
217. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576-78. In other contexts, "national security" has been held to
constitute a compelling interest that has justified racial classifications that might otherwise have been
unconstitutional. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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that the K.G.B. sought out, targeted and exploited gays, such that this group
presented a security risk.218 Under those particular circumstances, the Ninth
Circuit held at the time that the regulations were rational, given the "special
deference" due to the Executive Branch "when adjudicating matters involv-
ing their decisions on protecting classified information." 2,9 This result may
seem unfair, but not necessarily unconstitutional, particularly in the area of
public employment. Moreover, nothing in Lawrence demands a different
result. 220
V.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the cases Justice Scalia cites involving privacy and in-
timate association claims in public employment supports the Lawrence ma-
jority's proposition that Bowers has not engendered the type of societal reli-
ance that would caution the court against overruling it. These cases do not
support the proposition that reliance on Bowers was such that its overruling
will cause massive social disruption.
First, Lawrence did not expressly hold that the right of privacy was a
fundamental right in that situation. The Court may later clarify that point
and hold that Lawrence did establish such a right. Such a holding, how-
ever, would do little to disturb the fact that an employer's interests in main-
taining an orderly, conflict-free workforce often trump the interests of em-
ployees to maintain their job and an intimate relationship that the employer
believes clashes with its objectives. Indeed, even government decisions
that place burdens on the marital relationship-the most intimate of asso-
ciations deserving constitutional protection-are often reviewed for a ra-
tional basis, by way of the substantial and direct burden test, and upheld.
Likewise, where courts employ a Pickering balance test to an employee's
intimate association interests and the government employer's interests, the
scale often tips in favor of the employer, particularly where there is a poten-
218. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576-78.
219. Id. at 577.
220. If it is uncertain whether the Ninth Circuit would reach the same result today that it did in
1988 when High Tech Gays was argued, it would likely have more to do with the fall of the K.G.B. than
with Lawrence, the overruling of Bowers, or whether rational basis or strict scrutiny would be applicable
to the DOD regulations. See Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing, pre-
Lawrence, to find as a matter of law, based solely on High Tech Gays, that the FBI's decision to strip an
agent of his clearance and fire him for being gay was rational; the rationality of the DOD justification in
High Tech Gays had become questionable "in light of the post-High Tech Gays demise of the Soviet
Union and the uncertain future of the Soviet Secret Police"). Moreover, the court in Buttino also noted
that, subsequent to the date of arguments in High Tech Gays, a DOD study found that the pre-service
suitability of gays was every bit as good, if not better than it was for heterosexuals. Id. at 307 n.17.
Thus, if the rationality of the government's regulations in High Tech Gays is doubtful, it has to do with
other pre-Lawrence factors.
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tial for disruption in the workplace or interference with the employee's du-
ties. Moreover, the employer's interests, which are already reviewed defer-
entially, are afforded even greater weight when the employer is the military
or law enforcement. In sum, if it can be said that Lawrence will cause a
"massive disruption of the current social order," the ripples will be felt the
least in the area of privacy and intimate association claims in government
employment.
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